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T H E MOST widely noted aspect of Pope Benedict's speech at the 
University of Regensburg in September of 2006 has been his quotation 
of a brief passage from an otherwise obscure text chat, with "startling 
brusqueness," speaks ill of Islam. I The Holy Father stated that he found 
chis brusqueness "unacceptable," but, evidently, not so unacceptable as to 
preclude his quoting it. H is willingness to use the text has been judged 
still more unacceptable by large numbers of Muslims and non-Muslims 
alike. And this reaction in its various forms has diverted attention from 
and nearly ovenvhelmed the central message of the speech. That message 
focuses on the adequacy of human reason for coming co know God. 
According to Benedict's text, the quotation that has received so much 
attention serves merely as a starting-point for his reflections on the rela-
tion of faith and reason. He begins with Islam as one foil against which 
he presents the harmony of faith and reason. The second and main foil is 
not Islam, but what he calls "modern reason," "positivistic reason," or 
reason under a self-imposed limitation. Against a faith that denies God's 
reasonableness and against a rationality that denies faith's reasonableness, 
Benedict arriculates the harmony of faith and reason. 2 The present essay 
1 Pope Benedict XVI, "F:iich, Reason and the Uruversity: Memories and Reflec-
tions" (University of Regensburg. 12 Sepcember 2006), 'V3. The translation is 
taken front www.vatican.va and will be cited parenthetically in the text as 
"Faich" along with the paragraph number.The German text is available from the 
same source and retalru the same paragraph divmoru. 
2 James Schall emphasizes the significance of Benedict's speech for reinvigorating 
the proper understanding of the uruversity as the proper place for the cultivation 
of this harmony. See bis TI1e Re,11ensb11rg Lect11fl' (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's 
Press, 2007). especially 18- 40. 
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examines Benedict's argument for chis harmony and then rurns co the 
encyclical Deus Caritas Est for illustrative examples of v,trious kinds of 
harmonious co-operation between faith and reason.3 
Introductory Remarks 
le is helpful to begin with an initial sketch of a few clisunctions that an: 
operative in Benedict's speech. The title, "Faith, Reason, and the Univer-
sity: Memories and Reflections," announces the main theme of faith and 
reason. Beneclict uses each of these terms in multiple senses. The most 
prominent senses of "faith" distinguished in the speech are Christianity 
and Islam. In addition to these opposed forms of faith, of course, there 
also are opposed forms of Christianity. Similarly, "reason" has multiple, 
opposed meanings in the speech. One form of reason is modern scien-
tific reason and another form is philosophical reason. Again, philosophi-
cal reason, too, appears in multiple and opposed forms. When Benedict 
goes on to speak of harmony between fa ith and reason, not all forms of 
reason are equally harmonious with all forms of faith. Indeed, it seems 
that one of the goals of the speech is to show that, despite the distinction 
between faith and reason, Christian faith and philosophical reason rmy 
have more or more important things irt common with one another than 
either has with Islam or wich modern rationalism. Benedict's portrayal of 
possible harmony between faith and reason makes intelligible the activ-
ity of theology, understood as rational inquiry that begins with the 
acceptance of the deposit of faith. 4 
In addition co developed or sophisticated rational activities like theol-
ogy, philosophy, and science, Oenedict also draws our attention to the 
ordinary human rationality that is presupposed by each of them. We must 
recognize that human rationality docs not o riginate in the form of 
science or philosophy. Ordinary experience and the effort to understand 
the world precede the appearance of philosophy, which comes on the 
scene as part of the human effort to remedy and correct the fallibility and 
error ingredient co ordinary opinion. Philosophy is originally the attempt 
to perfect our rationality, which we first exercise in ordinary experience. 
' E1uyclim/ Lerter Deus Cunas Est .if tlrt' S11prt'1111· P.1111iff Bmt'din X VJ ''' 1/1e Bis/11>p.<, 
Priest.<, aud Dc<1ce111s, Ml'll <111d WiJ111e11 Rel1;11io11s, m11/ All tire l.Ay F.ti1/ifr1/, 011 C/1m1-
i1111 L.w<• (25 December 2005).The translation is taken from www.vatican.va and 
will be cited parentheucaUy Ill the 1ex1 as DCE ;Uong with che secnon number. 
4 Benedict speaks of theologian~ "inquiring about che reasonableness of faith" 
("Faith," 1) <ind. usmg almost che s.ime formulauon. he refers to theology 
"precisely as theology. as inquiry into the rauonaltry of fmh" (a/.( e~~111/icl1e 
TI1ct>ltl)!ir, al< Fr.we 1w/1 der ~·r11111ift 1/es G/1111/1e11s) (ibid., ~ 15). He Jlso says, 
"theologtJns seek co correlate !faith] w1ch reason as a whole" (ibid.. I). 
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Whereas modern science tends to depreciate the epistemic significance 
of the ordinary grasp of the world and to prefer the results of science as 
the decisive or final truth, Benedict wants to appeal to our common 
rationality that precedes science and to defend philosophy and theology 
as belonging to "the right use of reason" ("Faith," ifl). Our common 
rationality needs his support because human confidence in ordinary 
rationality comes under tremendous pressure both from some theologi-
cal views (Christian and non-Christian in origin) and from some scien-
tific views. In this speech Benedict emphasizes the way in which Islam 
can be used to stress divine transcendence to such a degree that all trust 
in human reason is voided. Also, he emphasizes the way in which the 
power of modem science, as the authoritative form of human knowing, 
leads us to dismiss as false or unreliable our ordinary grasp of the world. 
According to the positivistic view of reason Benedict criticizes, the sorts 
of questions that animate philosophy and theology-because they cannot 
be addressed in scientific ways-must be set aside as meaningless or non-
rarional. Benedict aims to separate faith and theology from the irra-
tionalism of some forms of Islam and to separate reason ,md philosophy 
from the truncated form of modern scientific rationalism. This opens the 
door to the harmony of faith and reason. 
The preceding sketch provides some indication of the analysis of 
Benedict's argument that follows below. The first two sections of this 
essay deal with the two pares of the Regensburg speech. The first pare of 
Benedict's speech is especially devoted to articulating the rationality or 
reasonableness of God and God's actions in contrast to claims that God's 
ways are so far beyond human reason as to be unintelligible to us. And 
the first section of this essay explains how Benedict presents the accessi-
bility of God to human reason. The second part of Benedict's speech 
analyzes the effort to dehellenize Christianity as an attempt to replace the 
Greek conception of rationality with the modern scientific conception. 
The second section of this essay explains Benedict's argument that reason 
must extend more broadly than the modern scientific form of reason, at 
least insofar as we must recognize the rational legitimacy of philosophy 
and theology. The two parts of I3enedict's speech together can be under-
stood to create the space for the harmony of faith and reason because in 
them Benedict shows how the recovery of a broadened understanding of 
reason makes it possible for us to recognize the intelligibility of God. The 
third section of this essay turns to Deus Caritas Est in order to show how 
Benedict has displayed there three distinct modes of the harmonious co-
operation of reason and faith. 
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Reason and God 
T he pope began his speech Jt R egensburg by telling a joke about atheism. 
More precisely, Pope Benedict repeated a former colleague's gibe chat 
pokes fun at professors and at believers. Believers amuse because they .1re 
sometimes naive and professors amuse because they are sometimes, at least 
from the point of view of common sense, senseless in their pursuit of 
rationality. This ~Ort of joke has such a long pedigree that 1t deserves to be 
considered with some seriousness. 5 The originator of Pope Benedict's joke 
made professors who are believers the target of his ridicule: "a colleague 
had said there was something odd ,1bout our university: it had two facuJ-
ties devoted to something th,H did not exist: God" ("Faith," 4).The surface 
of the joke ribs the academics and their penchanr for pointless investiga-
tions and tedious repetition. T he heart of the joke is the declaration of 
atheism. The heart of the joke divides people inro those who "know" there 
is no God and those who, nevertheless, continue to investigate or seek or 
speak about him. The charac:ter of the "knowing" here is not specialized, 
academic, insider's knowledge, as if this were a joke that onJy economists 
or physicists could find fimny. T he knowing mentioned is ordinary, every-
day knowledge, and the joke is about the persistence of what might be 
called superstition.6 The charge of persistent superstition is softened and 
made friendJy by its being covered over with an image of academic 
buffoonery. as if theism were nothing more than a charming eccentricity. 
5 Seriously rauonaJ men have been entermning Thracian maids and ochers at le.1st 
since Thales. See Plato, 171r11etetm 174a- b. Diogenes uertius records a slightly 
dllferem version (L.m~ of the Em mew Pl1ilt•5<1p/1m I, tr.nu. R. D. H1ck.s (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harv.i rd University Press, 1972), 34). For a modern appret-iation, see 
Martin Heidegger, IH1a1 '-' "771i1\e? trans. W B B.inon .ind Vera Deuuch (South 
Bend, Ind.: Regnery/Gateway, 1967), 2-4. Heidegger dr.1ws attention to 
Socrates·s claim in Plato's version: "T hlS jest also fits all those who become 
mvolved in philosophy." Socrates hunself has alw.iys been assoc1.ited with .iw.ire-
ness of the condinons presupposed by his own .ictivity. For a modern im.igc of 
senseless rationality 111 its scientific form, ~ee Fnednch N1eruche, "The Leech:· in 
77111s Spoke Z.1mthmfr<1, tr.im. Walter Kaufi11.um (New York: Pen gum Books, 1954), 
248-51. Th1s version could easily be turned agamst Benedict's former colle.igue. 
(,See " Faith," ~ 1 2. where Benedict JssertS that the modern concept of reason and 
the standard 1111posed by modern scienufic method causes the question of God 
to appe.ir "unsc1cnufic or pre-sc1cnufic." F.11th appears to be 1denucal with cred-
ulousness. that is, naive. uneducated opinion. For a contempor.iry articulation of 
the d1stmct1011 between thcologic.i.I faith and ordm.iry op1ruon. see Robert 
Sokolowski, "Philosophy and the Chriman Act of Faith," in C/1ri.<t1a11 Faith 1111d 
H111111111 1.: 111frNa111/11\I/ (W.ishmgcon. DC: Catholic University of America Press. 
2005), 25-37. 
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13ecause this simple joke arises from and reflects the modern form of 
reason Benedict wants to discuss, it serves to introduce the central theme 
of the speech. The joke characterizes Christian faith as superstition and 
atheism as comparatively respectable. To some extent, the plausibility of 
these views 1s itself an expression of the popular influence of the success-
ful part of the modern form of reason: modern natural science. The promi-
nence of science in contemporary life exerts tremendous influence as the 
authoritative form of knowing. What 1s not known or not yet known 
according to scientific methods or procedures is ordinarily regarded as not 
genuinely known, but only believed. To cling with faith to what 1s nor 
scientifically known or not scicnotically knowable is, in the presence of 
science as the standard of knowledge, hard to distinguish from superstition 
or what Pope Benedict calls "the realm of the subjective" ("Faith," ~13). 
Common sense 1tself has become mformed by science. More precisely, it 
has become informed by a popular and somewhat superfici.11 appreciation 
of the power of science. Especially (but not exclusively) through the perva-
siveness of technology m our lives, modern scientific reason dommates our 
world and comes to shape our thinking to the point that awareness of 
sophisticated, rationalist atheism becomes a component of common opin-
ion. Even if we do not hold atheistic opinions, we remain aware of the 
modern tendency to regard Christianity as unscientific and as belonging to 
the past. These matten. arc so thoroughly a part of our thinking that when 
a pope repeats a German professor's fifty-year-old joke, without explana-
tion, everybody gets it. We arc aw·arc that we live peaceably, side-by-side 
with atheists, many of whom base their atheism on modern science (or 
claim to do so). The Chrisoao and the atheist agree on the reliability of the 
science that enables them both to conceive of the earth as a planet orbit-
ing the sun and to travel by airplane or communicate by telephone.7 
Science unites us, even if our moral and religious beliefS, which we arc 
accustomed to regard as personal or private, remain fundamentally 
opposed.!! Our reliance on technology is only the most obvious way in 
which modernity shapes our common life. People who consider them-
selves un-modern or even anti-modern often do not realize the extent to 
7 Cf. Deu5 C11ri1115 £<1, §30a: "Today the means of mass commumcacion have nude 
our planet smaller." It 1s noc insignificant when a pope uses an astronomical term 
to designate the earth. 
K It 1s not quite true co say chis of some mamfesunons of Islam, which do seem to 
want co reject modern science and its mampulJtion of nature. But H does rcmam 
true that the contemporary Islamic opponents of the West acknowledge chat 
chert' is no effective subscituce for Western technology when they learn how co 
use .rnd become relidnt upon, for example, a1rplanl-s, tht> lntt>rnet, and plastic 
explos1vt>s detonated by ct>U phones. 
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which modernity, especially through common opinion, has shaped them 
before they have begun to reject it. The unreflective way in which very 
many people resort to modern understandings of rights or culture or 
history are simple manifestations of chis. It goes without saying that ideas 
are not bad or false because they are modern any more than they are true 
or good because they are old. T he point is chat these ideas dominate our 
common discourse and thus tend to shape our thinking without our 
awareness. For all of us, taking critical distance from modernity in order to 
understand it is a matter of learning and of un-learning habits of mind. ln 
a sense, then, the rationalist professor's joke is on all of us who get it. We 
are the ones who are under the sway, more or less, of the modern form of 
reason and we are more or less aware of that fact. 
To return, now, from these matters to the H oly Father's use of this 
joke, we note that he seems to have taken no offense from it. H e does not 
respond with a joke of his own at the expense of atheists.9 Instead, he 
appropriates the joke to make an observation about the role of reason for 
believer and unbeliever alike: despite the serious and fundamental divi-
sion between atheism and faith and despite the ridicule contained in the 
joke, the "profound sense of coherence within the universe of reason was 
not troubled" ("Faith," ~1 ). 10 Precisely because believers and unbelievers 
can share laughter about the silly manner in which some pursue ration-
ality we see that reason itself unites the believers and the atheists. Indeed, 
reason makes them the same. Reason is what they share and the medium 
in which they communicate with and understand one another, despite 
their profound differences. The sense of reason at issue here is more 
fundamental than the highly specialized form of scientific reason. One of 
the main goals of Benedict's speech is to recover some respect for this 
9 One could say that Benedict gently nirns the lesson of che joke against people 
like ics author. If the point of the joke is chat those who exercise reason must not 
forget the condition of the possibility of the exercise of reason (lest they fall in 
a well, as it were), Benedict's concluding remarks issue the same cautionary 
warning without che mockery: "The West has long been endangered by chis 
aversion tO the questions which underlie its rationalicy, and can only suffer great 
harm thereby" ("Faith," 116). Virgil Nemoianu notes the same pastoral gentle-
ness in Cardinal Ratzinger's exchange with Habermas. Cf. Nemoianu. "The 
Church and the Secular Establishment," ~os 9 (Spring 2006): 36-38. 
in Pope Benedicc interprets the joke generously and, since he was there and he 
knows the original speaker of chese words, one must concede to him that no 
serious attack on the theology fuculties lies within the joke. Nevertheless, in light 
of what the Holy Father goes on to say about che second scage of dchelleniza-
tion ("Faith," ~11-13 and ~15-16), one must also recognize that some serious 
members of the "universe of reason" may in fact look forward to the withermg 
away of cheology from the universicy. 
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more basic sense of reason. Human beings are rational not only when we 
are scientific; we arc rational also in the pre-scientific and ordinary use of 
reason. The H oly Father needs to appeal to this more fundamental level 
in order to indicate the path co overcoming the division between an 
Islamic extremist, a Christian believer, and a rationalist atheist. I I Reason-
ableness makes all of us the same as one another. Moreover, as he argues 
in the first half of the ~peech, reasonableness makes us one with God. 
Benedict's argument requires the recovery of ordinary rationality and of 
the rational grasp of God. 
The joke's role in this argument is ambiguous. As originally delivered, 
the joke appeals to common sense as informed by the specialized ration-
ality of modern science. It both relies upon ordinary reason and exhibits 
the scientific depreciation of ordinary reason. As appropriated by the 
Holy Father, the joke serves a different purpose. Whereas the professor 
meant to disparage ordinary reason, the pope means to rehabilitate it as 
part of an attempt to rehabilitate the rationality of other non-scientific 
forms of reason, namely, philosophy and theology.12 The first half of the 
speech is especially devoted to articulating the coherence of faith and 
philosophical rationality; the second half of the speech is especially 
devoted to showing that even modern science requires a philosophical 
form of reason. All of this 1s folded into the joke. Because of the way the 
joke implies the incompatibility of faith and reason, it serves to introduce 
each of the central ideas of the whole speech. We must admire the 
complexity Benedict has incorporated into such a simple joke. 
Let us return once more to the speech itself and see how Benedict 
enters into the topic treated in the first half. H e mentions this joke in the 
process of recollecung certain aspects of his days at the University of 
Bonn. It is not the experience of being at Regensburg and of being once 
again in the uruversity atmosphere that calls up these recollections. The 
joke is not merely an amusing anecdote, marginally related to the central 
11 In his reply co this speech- "Ein Bewusstsein von dem, was fehlt iiber Glauben 
und Wissen und den Defoitismus der modernen Vernunft," Ne11e Z11rd1er Zei"1t111.J!, 
10 February 2007- Jiirgen Habermas. disagrees with Benedict regardmg what 
constitutes "conunon reason," but he agrees chat that is che focal point: "Fides 
quaerens incelleccum-so bcgriissenswerc die Suche nach der Verniinfcigkeic des 
Glaubcns isc, so wenig hilfreich scl1einc es mir iu sein, jene drei Enchel-
lenisierungsschiibe, die zum modernen Sclbstverscindnis der sakularen Vcrnunfc 
be1gecragen haben, aus der Genealogie der 'gemeinsamen Vemunft' von Gliiub1-
gen. Unglaub1gen und Andersglaubigen auszublenden." 
12 See, for example, Benedict. "Faith," iflS: "The intention here 1s not one of 
retrenchment or ne~uve cmic1sm, but of broadening our concept of reason and 
its applicauon •· 
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theme of the speech. Instead, he says, the recollections (including the 
joke) are called to mind by his reading of Professor Theodore Khoury's 
edition of a fourteenth-century dialogue, between a Byzantine emperor 
and an educated Persian, treating, among other matters, the relation 
between three laws (corresponding to Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). 
The pope selects one point from the dialogue to begin his reflections on 
faith and reason: "(H]ere l would like to discuss only one point-which, 
in the context of the issue of'faith and reason', I found interesting and 
which can serve as the starting-point for my reflections on this issue" 
("Faith," ~2). The reflections concern the issue of faith and reason. The 
reflections take as their starting-point a remark by the emperor about the 
attempt to spread faith through violence. "Not acting reasonably (cruv 
A.6yc.p is contrary to God's nature .... Whoever would lead someone to 
faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without 
violence and threats .... To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need 
a strong arm, or weapons of any kind." 13 
As a preliminary observation, it should be noted that, despite their 
being made in the context of the use of violence by members of a partic-
ular religious tradition, these claims are non-sectarian. Any religious 
attempt to use violence would serve the essential purpose here.14 lt 
should also be noted that the joke is equally non-sectarian. The joke 
could be made in the context of any theology faculty. T he form of 
reasoning that ends in the joke begins with the dismissal of all faith as 
superstition. At this point, these considerJtions make it seem that the joke 
and the emperor's remarks contribute more or less equally to the identi-
fication of the theme of Benedict's reflections. Whereas the joke presents 
a modern form of tension between faith and reason, the emperor's words 
evoke the problem in a different way, which precedes modernity and yet 
remains with us today. Against the conception of God as utterly tran-
scendent and unintelligible in his power, the Holy Father affirms the 
"profound harmony" (" Faith," ~5) of the God of faith with human 
reason. At the same time, the Holy Father affirms the legitimacy of 
inquiry into God as a proper exercise of human reason, over against those 
13 The words quoted are those of the emperor. They appear in paragraph 3 of 
Benedict's speech. Benedict cites this source: Theodore Khoury, ed., "Manuel II 
Paleologue, Entretiens avec un Musulman. 7e Controverse," So11rce.< Clrrhie1111e.<. 
n. 115. (Paris. 1966). 
14 Ir seems rhar for the pope's esst"nrial point about the relation of God, soul, faith, 
reason, and violence. the specific case of Islam is accidental. He nught have 
chosen a different example to make the same point. Thac said, it does not seem 
to be accidental that, in present circumstances. he chose Islam. 
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who view all speech about God as belonging to myth ("Faith," 1]6) and 
as a failure to be rational. IS He navigates between two poles, one chat 
locates God far above human reason and one that locates God beneath. 
The focal point is the articulation of reason (1) against chose who agree 
that God has revealed himself, but claim that God's revelation squelches 
rationality, and (2) against those who agree that human reason reveals to 
us the world, but claim that it reveals a world without God. The same 
focus on the proper grasp of reason can be framed negatively: (1) on the 
one hand, if reason genuinely were only the modern, shrunken form of 
reason, it might deserve condemnation m the name of God; (2) on che 
other hand, if God were understood as God is presented by those who 
use v10lence to spread belief, reason suggests or supports atheism.16 
To address the substance of the emperor's claims, we note that Bene-
dict uses two formulas to express the focal point, one negative and one 
positive. Negatively, he returns ag.1in and again co the thesis that "not 
acting reasonably" or "not acting with foxos" is contrary to God's nature. 
Positively, Benedict asserts that God has revealed himself as loxos. The 
conviction that acting unreasonably contradicts God's nature is, Oenedict 
says, a Greek idea. The operung of the Gospel of John (" In the beginning 
was the foxos"), Benedict says, pronounces "the final word on the biblical 
concept of God" ("Faith," 5). In VJew of the title and central asscmon 
of his encyclical Deus Caritas Est, this 1s an extraordmary statement from 
Benedict. James Schall po111ts in this direction when he writes, "Thus as 
the Pope's first Encyclical might be called 'Deus est O)lape,' so this lecture 
is 'Deus est logos.'" 17 Indeed, where the Regensburg speech tends co 
make the biblical and Greek view of God sound almost the same, the 
encyclical tends to emphasize the fact that the biblical or Christian view 
transcends the philosophical view: "The world of the Bible presents us 
with a new image of God" (DCE, §9).18 Saying th.u God 1s love is not 
the same as saying that God is logos, even if it is true that God 1s both lcixos 
15 Sec Bencdicr, "Faith," 6. Benedict presents the biblical revel;iuon of God as .i 
challenge, analogous to the Socrattc challenge, to mythKal presentanons of che 
d1v111c. For the Socratic challenge see, for example. Plato's R<'p11blic 377e-391 e. 
"'Compare Jurgen Habermas and Joseph R atzinger, 771e Dialectic..< of Semlanzation: 
011 R~aso11 a11d Re/iJ1io11, ed. Florian Schuller, trans. Brian McNeil (San Fr.111c1sco: 
Ignatius Press, 2005), 64-66. 
17 James Schall, 771e Rege11sb11'R Lecture, 123. 
111 Also in Deus Caritas Est,§ 11, Benedict writes, "The first novelty of b1blu:.il f.uth 
conmts, as we have seen, in its image of God." Additionally. l3ened1ct refers co 
Anstotle's thought as "the height of Greek philosophy," bu1 notes tha1 his view 
of God falls short of the b1bhcal view precisely on the underst;mdmg of whether 
God is the object of love or hunself a pe!'1ona.I lover (ibid .. §9). 
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and love. In Deus Cnriftls Esr, Benedict writes: "God is the absolute and 
ultimate source of all bemg; but this universal principle of creaaon-the 
u~111>s, primordial reason-is at the same time a lover with all the passion 
of a true love" (DCE, §10). Also, "The ancient world had dimly perceived 
that man's real food-what truly nourishes him as man-is ultimately the 
L1gos, eternal wisdom: this same L>gos now truly becomes food for us-
as love" (DCE, § 13). The thesis that God is good in himself and the thesis 
that God is benevolent toward human beings, whether taken separately 
or in combination, obviously are not equivalent to the thesis that God, in 
himself, is love. It has been rcve.iled that God is love; this does not seem 
to be the sort of thing that might have been discerned by reason. It 
seems, rather, to require revelation (like the doctrine of the Trinity). since 
it concerns the inner life of God. The encyclical unambiguously preserves 
the difference between the pagan and the biblical understandings of God. 
This helps us avoid misreading the speech as if its emphasis on the 
congruity of philosophy and theology implied identical understandings 
of God. Perhaps when Benedict calls this the final word on the biblical 
concept of God, he understands ft~l/<>S as Word and as implying the 
doctrine of the Trinity. Obviously, if this is the case, the theological or 
biblical sense of fogos exceeds the philosophical sense and yet Benedict 
can still assert that agreement obtains between the philosophical and 
theological understandings. 
Thus Benedict is able to declJre, "From the very heart of the Christ-
ian faith and, at the same time, the heart of Greek thought now joined 
to faith, Manuel [[ was able to say: Not to act 'with /1~11os' is contrary to 
God's nature" ("Faith,'' ,16).19 The careful formulation Benedict uses here 
preserves Greek thought and Christian faith as two distinct clements; it 
does not collapse their difference and fuse them into an identity, even 
when both faith and reason use the same formula to speak about God. 
Preserving the duality of Christian faith and Greek thought suggests that 
philosophy and theology coincide or agree in this thesis and yet it under-
scores the fact that they assert this thesis in two distinct ways.The Socratic 
critique of the irrationality of myth "stands in close analogy" to the bibli-
cal revelation and its "new understanding of God," which "separates this 
God from all other divinities" ("Faith," ~6). Whereas the Socratic critique 
rejects the ignobility of the mythical gods from the standpoint of ration-
ality, the biblical revelation goes deeper than the philosophical grasp of 
I? "Manuel II. hac wirklich ms dem mneren Wesen des chmtlichen Glaubens 
heraus und zugleich ms dem Wesen des Griechischen, das s1ch m1t dem Gl.tuben 
verschmolzen harce, s.igen konnen: Niche 'nut dem Logos' handeln. !St dem 
Wesen Gottes zuwider:· 
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the divine and yet confirms, in a way, the philosophical view that God is 
not against reason. Philosophic reason recognizes that irrationaliry is not 
worthy of God and yet does not and cannot attain to the content of reve-
lation. God alone reveals himself as loxos in a way that transcends every 
mythical presentation of the divine, every man-made idol, and even the 
divine nature grasped by the philosophers. Benedict speaks of a harmony 
here between the Greek philosophical idea and the biblical revelation 
that begins in the Old Testament and culminates in John's thesis. Philos-
ophy and philosophy's distinctive manner of grasping this thesis are not 
simply absorbed into theology and the theological mode of grasping the 
divine with faith. "Harmony" between philosophy and theology requires 
them to remain distinct from one another. Philosophy retains its auton-
omy and integrity and, thus, its distinctive understanding, as a genuine 
achievement of reason.20 
Reason and Science 
The first eight paragraphs of the Regensburg speech are devoted mainly 
to this encounter of the Greek and biblical understandings of the divine. 
In the remainjng eight paragraphs of the speech, the Holy Father traces 
the relation of Christian faith and human reason from what he identifies 
as an initial consonance in the recognition of the reasonableness of God 
and God's ways to the rejection of this integration and the effort to 
debcllenize Christianity. Benedict identifies three waves or stages in the 
project of dchellenization. He characterizes the first stage as part of the 
Reformation-era attempt to bypass philosophy and to eliminate rational 
metaphysics in order to return to faith rooted solely in Scripture ("Faith ;' 
~10). He gives only a brief mention of the contemporary, third stage of 
dehellenization, which he characterizes as the attempt to separate the 
Hellenistic culture surrounding the early Church from the simple and 
20 For a complete discussion of the distinction summarized here between the Chris-
rian sense of the divine and the sense of the divine evident to pagan philosophers 
and theologians, see Robert Sokolowski, T71e God of Fair/1 a11tl Re11.<011: Fo1111datiom 
of Cliri.<tian T71eolo,(!y (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 
1993), especially chapters 5 and 10, md C1'ristia11 Fai11' a111I H11ma11 U11dersta11di1~f!, 
especially chapters I through 4. Sokolowski emphasizes the "shift" in human 
thought that is required once we come to understand the sense of the divine 
required in Christian belief. Christian faith does not simply add to the under-
scanding of God that is achieved by reason; Christian faith presents a new under-
standing of the divine, which, as a matter of historical fact, was simply not 
achieved apart from revelarion (see Dm.< Can't a.< Est, §9). The achievements of 
reason independent of revelation are not negated, but appreciated anew in the 
context of a deeper understanding. 
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prior and presumably universal New Testament message ("Faith," iJ14). 
Benedict devotes by far the greater part of his remarks to the second stage 
of the dehellenizing process. To illustrate this stage, he singles out as its 
"outstanding representative" Adolf von Harnack, whose "goal was to 
bring Christianity back into harmony with modern reason, liberating it, 
that is to say, from seemingly philosophical and theological elements, such 
as faith in Christ's divinity and the t riune God" (" Faith," iJl 1). He meanc 
to set theology in its rightful place within the university shaped by 
modern scientific reason. The "harmony" between faith and reason that 
would be the goal of this project mimics the harmony between faith and 
reason that emerged from the original and, in Benedict's view, providen-
tial encounter between the biblical message and Greek thinking ("Faith," 
iJS). The original harmony obtained when a philosophically purified 
understanding of the divine nature was coordinated with the elevating 
message of Christian revelation; the new harmony attempts to rid theol-
ogy of those elements that cannot be drawn down to a "self-linutation" 
(Selbstbescliriink1111J1) ("Faith,'' iJl I) and "reduction" ( Verkiirzung) ("Faith," 
iJ12) of reason. T he critique of this modern concept of reason is the Holy 
Father's target in the whole speech (see especially "Faith," iJlS). Moder-
nity constricts reason, and then the second stage of dehellenization 
attempts to constrict faith to the standards laid down by the constricted 
form of reason. T hese standards are, according to Pope Benedict, Carte-
sianism (which he identifies as a form of Platonism) and empiricism 
("Faith," ,]11). 
The story of modernity remains complex and controversial; doubtless, 
there will be criticisms brought against his claim concerning the synthe-
sis of these two poles of thought. T here is need for a much fuller devel-
opment of Benedict's understanding of the synthesis of Cartesianism and 
empiricism. At the present time, it is useful to add a few comments about 
modernity, even if they must remain brief and incomplete. Cartesianism, 
or Platonism, "presupposes the mathematical structure of matter, its 
intrinsic rationality, which makes it possible to understand how matter 
works and use it efficiently" ("Faith," iJl 1). The empirical component is 
"nature's capacity to be exploited for our purposes, and here only the 
possibility of verification or falsification through experimentation can 
yield decisive certainty" ("Faith," iJl 1). In these formulations, Cartesian-
ism and empiricism are essentially epistemological in their focus. They 
express the relation between the soul, or mind, and narure, or matter. In 
order to understand the synthesis of these two elements, we note tl1at 
their point of contact is the use or ma1upu1ation of nature. Modernity 
comes to light, then, as a search for certain knowledge of nature for the 
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sake of mastery. Benedict does not expressly say so, but it is possible to 
understand the synthesis of Carcesianism and empiricism m terms of this 
overarching goal of mastery. In this understanding, the mathematical 
conception of nature is not accidentally related to the goal of mastery. 
Instead, we recognize that the drive to master nature effectively requires 
that nature be conceived mathematically. The modern concept of nature, 
in Hans Jonas's memorable phrase, contains "manipulability at its theo-
retical core."21 As Cartesianism and empiricism agree in the understand-
ing of nature, so they agree in the concept correlative to nature: soul, or 
mind. Rationalists like Descartes and empiricists like John Locke, what-
ever else their differences, share to a certain extent what may be called 
the modern docmne of the soul. According to chis view, the soul is the 
principle of human knowledge, but it is not the form of the body and 
not the source of motion in the living body. Plato, Aristode, Lucretius, 
and Thomas Aquinas, to name a few important representatives of the pre-
modern tradition, understood the soul to be the principle of human 
knowledge, but also the principle of vital motion in the body. The 
modern approach, by contrast, conceives soul essentially as a mind or ego 
or self, which remains problematically related to the human body. 22 The 
human body is understood to be one part of the larger material whole, 
called nature, the manipulable object of modern science. 23Thus, the epis-
temological standards of modern thought (expressed in Cartcsianism/ 
Platonism and empiricism) can be understood to be intimately related to 
the modern goal of the mastery of na cure. 24 Mastery of nature is pursued 
for the relief and benefit of man's estate, that is, with a humanitarian 
21 Hans Jonas, "Seventeenth Cenrury and After: The Mearung of the Scientific and 
Technological Rcvoluuon," in Pf1ilo.wpltirul Essays (Chicago and London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 48. The significance of the new concept of 
narure is stressed by R.attinger in his dialogue with Habcrmas. See Jiirgen 
Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, 71re Dialectic.< of Sewlarization: On Reason and 
Religion, 69-71. The sepuauon of reason from nature IS another way of express-
mg the distmcuon of soul, or uund, from body, or narure. 
22 Tb.IS concepuon of soul explains why, m Deus Caritas Est (§5). Benedict finds it 
necessary to correct a prevalent ffilSUndersandmg and emphasize the uruon of soul 
and body in order to arucufate the proper understanding of human erotic love. 
2~ Cf. Jiirgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, 71re Dialectics of Sewlarization: 011 
Reason a11d Rel(11io11, 65. 
24 See Jacob Klem, "Modern Rationalism," Lect11re5 and Essays, ed. Robert B. 
Williamson and Elliott Zuckerman (Annapolis, Md.: St. john's College Press, 
1985), 53-64, Richard Kennington, "The 'Teaching of Narure' m Descartes's 
Soul Doctrine," R,.,,1ttv of .Wetaplrysic.• 26 (1972): 86-117; Richard Kennington, 
"Descartes and Mastery of Nature," in °'Jla111s111, Mediane, a11d Metap/1ysics, ed 
Stuart F. Spicker (Dordrccht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1978). 201-23 
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intention. And, according to the founders of modern thought, it is this 
beneficence, more than anything else, that disnnguishes rhe modern form 
of reason from the pre-modern form.25 T he goal is to solve, through 
human agency, the troubles besetting human life. T his humanitarianism 
arises in the image and likeness of the service of charity, but it is not char-
ity. It is a this-worldly solution to this world's problems. It substitutes for 
the theological solution to original sin. At its heart, it is the modern 
origin of what, in Deus Caritas Est, l3enedict calls "social assistance." It is 
thus also unsurprising to see chat the attempt to conform Christian reve-
lation to modern scientific reason "would end up reducing Christianity 
to a mere fragment of its former self" (" Faith," , [13). 
Against this constriction offaith to a shrunken reason, Benedict proposes 
that faith and reason must come together"in a new \.vay" ("Faith," 15). He 
deems it not enough co return to previous formulations and to repeat 
what was once adequate. It is not sufficient to declare that "truth does not 
contradict truth" and pronounce a blessing on modern science with 
naive optimism that, in the end, all it shows will prove to be in harmony 
with one's catechism. Modern science is a form of reason, but a 
constricted form. T he second stage of dehellenization shows that some 
advocates of modern science do not rest content with coexistence along-
side Christian faith. The second stage asserts or presupposes the illegiti-
macy of faith in the face of that form of reason. In chis conflict, modern 
scientific reason, owing especially co its apparent confirmation in our 
reliance on the technology science generates ("Faith," ~1 1 ), has tremen-
dous rhetorical superiority over Christian faith for most people. Science 
is the authority we acknowledge in common by the way we live. Naive 
optimism that truth docs not contradict truth is, in chis context, akin co 
laying down one's arms and giving away the store, so to speak. Benedict 
himself takes up metaphorical (as opposed to rcaJ) arms to stake om and 
defend a broadened grasp of the role of reason in human life. The scien-
tific form of reason must be given its due, but the broader claims of a 
more complete sense of reason must also be advanced. 
Consequently, we are faced wuh a reducrion of the radius of science 
and reason. one which needs to be questioned . 
. . . If science as a whole is thi~ and this alone, then it is man himself 
who en<ls up being reduced, for the specifically human questions about 
our ongm and desuny, the quesaons raised by religion and erlucs. then 
have no place withm the purview of collective reason as defined by 
2; See Francis Bacon, TI1e Atlm1ue111rn1 of Le11mi1~1/. ed. G. W. l{jcchin (London and 
Melbournc:J. M. Dent&. Sons, 1973), 34-35. 
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"science," so understood, and must thus be relegated to the realm of the 
subjective. ("Faith," ~12-13) 
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Benedict's "critique of modern reason from within" (Selbstkritik der 
111odcrne11 Vernwift) ("Faith;' ~15), then, aims at the reinvigoration of a 
broader sense of human reason. The proper exercise of human reason 
does not begin with and is not to be identified with modern science. He 
wants to reassert the use of reason that precedes science and that helps us 
discover the need for science and establish the goals and methods of 
science. In our pre-scientific or extra-scientific lives, we properly exercise 
reason in non-scientific ways.As Robert Sokolowski has argued, we exert 
our rationality not only in traditional logical functions of judgment and 
inference, but also and most broadly in the introduction of syntax into 
our experience. 26 Reason is at work in all intelligent perception and in 
the formation of opinion. These sorts of exercises of reason prepare for 
the specialized form that is science, which never completely replaces the 
need for the original, intelligent encounter with the world. Pope Bene-
dict is not only reminding us that modern science presupposes pre-scien-
tific e:>.."Perience in the world. He is more fundamentally defending 
philosophy and theology as the proper forms of reason for addressing 
essential human questions, which arise necessarily from ordinary experi-
ence. He is defending them as proper forms of rational inquiry. 
Theology, as "inquiry into the rationality of faith" ("Faith," ~15), and 
philosophy, as inquiry into the rationality of ordinary human experience, 
belong in the university alongside modern science.27 The rationality of 
philosophy and theology needs to be rearticulated in the context of 
modern science, over against the tendency to reduce all that precedes 
science and all that is not science to mere opinion, prejudice, or superstition 
("Faith," ~13). Descartes provides the paradigmatic expression of the atti-
tude animating this tendency when he formulates his methodical doubt as 
the dismissal, as utterly false, of all opinions that can in the least be doubted. 
His subsequent re-admission of some of these opinions occurs on the 
terms of his rational method, which he brings forward as the sole arbiter of 
26 See Sokolowski, "The Autonomy of Philosophy in Fides et Ratio," chapter 1 in 
C/rristi/111 Faitlr and H11111an U11del'$ta11dit1J!. See also his book Phe110111e11olll.J!y of tlie 
H111111111 Person (Cambridge: Cambridge Universiry Press, 2008). 
27 Again, it is important co preserve philosophy and theology as cwo forms of 
rational inquiry. The two may even consider the very same experiences as start-
ing points, but they do so in different ways. "For philosophy and, albeit i11 a differ-
e111 way, for theology, listening co the great experiences and insights of the 
religious traditions of humanity, and chose of the Christian faith in particular. is 
a source of knowledge" ("Faith," 116) (emphasis added]. 
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truth and falsiry.211 It is undeniable, however, that Descartes's method and 
the argument he 1mkes for its superioriry to "the speculaave philosophy of 
the schools" are themselves the fruit of a philosophical exercise of reason 
and not the fruit of scientific rcason.2'1 Science is a derivative form of 
human reason and we suffer great harm if we acquiesce to the widespread 
aversion to the non-scientific thinking that underlies scientific rationaliry 
("Faith," 16). Benedict pursues this line of argument 111 his concluding 
paragraph. He locates the necessary origins of modern scientific reason in 
uses of reason more fimdament,11 than science itself. Moreover, ultimate 
questions belong to "other modes and planes of thought-to philosophy 
and theology" ("Faith," ,it 6). This kind of argument opens the way for 
those who are formed by modern science and respect its achievements to 
catch sight of the fact that science is not self-sufficient and cannot be 
exclusively the perfection of human reason. 
Thus Benedict\ speech is primarily philosophical. More precisely, in 
the name of theology he calls for the completion of what is essentially a 
philosophical task: "The courage to engage the whole breadth of reason, 
and not the denial of its grandeur--this is the programme with which a 
theology grounded in Biblical faith enters into the debates of our time" 
(" Faith," ~16). His "self-critique of modern reason" ("Faith," ~15) points 
to the need to draw in the claim of modern scientific reason to hold 
exclusive power co determine the true and the false and the need to 
expand our recognition of the range of reason's activities. Denedict's 
speech does not reject modern reason, but rationally displays that it repre-
sents a " reduction of the radius of science and reason" (" Faith," 12). He 
calls for us to re-create the logicaJ space necessary for the philosophical 
exercise of reason, which space 1s closed off whenever the positivistic 
interpretation of reason dominates. This philosophical achievement also 
makes room for a genuinely rational theology. The completion of Bene-
dict's proposaJ, then, requires us to articulate the proper character of 
philosophicaJ reason such that it may be brought together with faith "in 
a new way" ("Faith," 1jl 5). The model for the new harmony is the orig-
inal harmony identified by Benedict earlier in his speech ("Faith," 1j5-8). 
The new harmony cannot, however, be a simple repetition of old formu-
las. The old formulas will not hold the same power until we reinvigorate 
the philosophical exercise of reason in the contemporary context. The 
new way of bringing faith and reason together, consequently, also requires 
us to articulate a broadened concept of human reason that can acknowl-
ix Compare Desc.mes's "First Med11auon .. w11h his "Sixth Med1u.uon .. in his ,\fetf1-
1111io11s cllr First 1'/1ifosoplry. 
2'! Consui<.'r the fi~1. second. and sixch parts of Descartes's Di~<1umr 011 Mrtlwtf 
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edge the achievement of modern science without being overwhelmed by 
the constriction of reason that has characterized the dominant interpre-
tation of modern science. 
R eason and Faith in Harmony 
In the R egensburg speech Pope Benedict articulates the possibility of the 
harmonious interaction of fai th and reason. In the encyclical Deus C11ri-
t11s Est, he displays the harmonious exercise of faith and reason in the 
contemporary context. In the speech, Benedict carves out the space for 
theology and philosophy between an Islamic form of anti-reason .md a 
scientific form of self-constrained reason.The emphasis in the speech falls 
on the poles against which he distinguishes the common and bro,1der 
form of reason. In the encyclical, Benedict displays the co-operntive rela-
tionship between philosophical and theological use~ of reason. The final 
section of this essay draws attention to three ways in which our reason in 
its ordinary and its philosophical forms can function in harmony with 
Christian faith. What follows does not provide a summary o r analysis of 
the doctrine of the entire encyclical, but only illustrates the relation of 
re.ison and faith discernible within it. 
Reaso11 as Preparatory for Faith 
Just as the R egensburg speech concludes with the necessity of recogmz-
ing the .1ctivity of reason that precedes science, so the encyclical recog-
nizes th.it reason operates prior to one's encounter with revelation. 
Indeed, the necessary exercise of reason and of philosophy prior to the 
emergence of science has a kind of paraJlel in the uses of reason that are 
presupposed by revelation and theology. Faith does not do away with the 
need for the natural and rational grasp of things. Instead, any effort to 
make the faith known must appeal to and draw upon the natural exer-
cise of reason in order to make its content accessible. In the words of the 
Byzantine emperor, "Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the 
ability to speak well dlld to reason properly, without violence and threats" 
("Faith," ~3). The soul's reasonableness precedes acceptance of the faith, 
and the one who spreads the fa1th must respect and appeal to this reason-
ableness. Without drawing explicit attention to it, Benedict carefully 
displays his awareness of this rhetorical situation. 
One illustration, then, of harmony between reason and faith arises 
becau-;c our natural experience of the world and our understanding of that 
experience provide the basis for our understanding the content of divine 
revelation. As Benedict puts it, Christianity is not "detached from the vital 
relations fundament.11 to human existence" and not "cut off from the 
.. 
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complex fabnc of human Life"; he goes so far as co say that philosophical 
reflections on that experience can bring us co the threshold of faith (DCE, 
§7). Our natural understanding of the world, e~pecially as ic is perfected in 
ph1losoplucal reasoning, can be preparatory for faith. If we cannot ascend by 
our own powers from ordinary experience to faith, revelation muse descend 
to our level and be expressed with reference to that ordinary experience.30 
Thus, when it is revealed or when we are told, for example, that God is our 
father, we already have experience of and underscandmg of what father-
hood is. Whether our personal experience of foe hers is good or bad, skewed 
or insightful, we know that there are good and bad fathers and we know 
something of what constitutes the excellence of a good father. Tlus cogni-
tive grasp of fatherhood precedes and conditions our access co what faith 
proposes about God as father. We understand, at first, the meaning of the 
revelation of God as father in light of our natural understanding of father-
hood and-apart from direct and miraculous illumination by God--our 
grasp of this revelation is Limited by the imperfections of our knowledge of 
the natural meaning of fatherhood. The newly revealed theological teach-
ing becomes accessible because of what we <1lready know about fathers. 
A similar thing happens when we try to understand the mystery of 
God's love and the statement chat God is love. The explication of che theo-
logical meanmg of love requires preliminary attention to the ordinary 
understanding oflove:"we cannot simply prescind from the meaning of the 
word in the different cultures and in present-day usage" (DCE, §2). Thus, 
in the first part of the encyclical, the H oly Father emphasizes that the word 
love has many different meanings in human discourse, and he begins from 
chis multiplicity of meanings (DCE, §2). About these multiple meanings, 
he asks essentially a philosophical question-whether love is one in form 
or many. Benedict tries to show that "the message oflove proclaimed to us 
by the Bible :ind the Church's Tradition has some points of contact with 
the common human experience of love" (DCE, §7). God's revelation 
about love does not confront us with something wholly new, something 
completely alien from our experience, and .Benedict emphasizes the 
"intrinsic link" between God's love and human love (DCE, §1). In addi-
tion to the human experience of love, there are whole schools of thought 
about what love is or means and what God is, and it is in this context that 
-"' In the first puagraph of the encychcal. Benedict quotes the First Lener of John 
(4: 16): "We h.ive come to know .ind co believe m the love God has for us." In 
the very next sentence he writes," IM> /iml(' ((1111<' to belier'<' i11 God'.< /or•t•: in these 
words lhe Christian can express the fundamental decision of his life." The deci-
sion is necess;irily preceded by some knowledge or understanding of whal is co 
be accepled m faith. 
hr 
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God's revelation about love and about God as love appears. The Holy 
Father appeals not only to experience but especially to the authoritative 
opinions and thoughtful appropriations of that experience.JI Revelation 
does not obliterate human reason and it does not teach something so 
unprecedented that we have to abandon what we already know about the 
world and human nature. Instead, revelation first draws from and then tran-
scends our ordinary understanding oflove and the philosophical reflections 
on that ordinary undcrstanding.32 Faith preserves the sphere in which 
natural human reason must be cultivated and perfected. In revelation we 
find the completion of reason, and we find unanticipated truths that are 
intelligible in their difference from what reason has disclosed already about 
nature. Just as our appreciation of divine paternity as first in itself never 
allows us to dispense with the understanding of the fatherhood that is first 
for us, so our understanding that God is love requires our thoughtful grasp 
of love as we meet with it naturally and as we grasp its several forms 
through reason and experience.This is one way in which philosophy assists 
theology; it helps prepare our understanding of the distinctively Christian 
as something that confirms reason and goes beyond 1t. 
Reason as Self-Critical 
Sometimes, instead of preparing us to grasp the content of revelation, our 
natural grasp of things becomes an obstacle to our acceptance of the faith. 
We have seen a prominent example of this in the Regensburg speech. The 
modern form of scientific reason presents a formidable obstacle to faith. 
Benedict's response to this is a "critique of modern reason fiom within" 
(Selbstkritik der modernen Vernwifi) ("faith;' ~1 5). As pope, as a religious 
leader, he advances an argument that takes part in the self-correction of 
reason. He does not simply condemn positivistic science in the name of 
faith. Instead, he makes a rational argument about the proper use of 
reason.33 In the encyclical, we see another illustration in Benedict's 
recounting of an objection against Church teaching on charity. The objec-
31 The very first foornote m the encyclical 1s to a text of N1eczsche, in which Niet-
zsche declares that Chmu.mity has corrupted the natural undemanding of rros 
(Deus Carita.< Est, §3). Benedict appeals to a philosopher to make revelacion clear. 
32 When Benedict presenu the biblical view of God as both l~s and love 
(discussed above), he adds:" Eros is thus supremely ennobled, yet at the same time 
it is so purified as to become one with 0.l{ape" (Deus Can.ta.< Est, §10). 
33 James Schall emphasizes tlus m his mtroducuon to 111t Rtgerub11rg l..L!111" (South 
Bend, Ind.: St. Augusune's Press, 2007). "We are not asked to 'believe· the Pope 
in some theologically technical sense of that noble word. We are asked rather to 
grasp his argument" (10). Again, "Thus, this whole lecture is based upon a 
sustained argument about reason" ( 16). 
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tion is raised in the name ofJmtice as understood in Marxism (DCE, §26). 
Benedict introduces Marxism as insisting that the Church's charitable 
acovicy participates tn the preservation of an UllJUSt social order. Through 
the construction of a just socicry, Marxism aims to eliminate the need for 
charicy, which, to the Marxist, seems to be an ineffective or deplorable 
sub~titute for justice. Benedict says, "There is admittedly some truth to chis 
argument, but also much that is mistaken" (DCE, §26). I le goes on co say 
both that Marxist clam1S about the solution to social problems have proven 
to be illusory and that there must be "dialogue with all those seriously 
concerned for humanicy and for the world in which we live" (DCE, §27). 
The correction of the illusions of Marxist thought can be made authorita-
tively on the basis of revelation, but it is also important that this t.1ke place 
at the level of practical reason and political philosophy.34 Benedict refers to 
the illusions, but the rcsponsibilicy for achievmg justice in the political 
order remains with pr.:ictical reason and political philosophy. It does not 
become the responsibilicy of the Church's charitable activity to produce a 
jmc social order. In light of the faith, the pope urges a corrected exercise of 
practical reason. 
This correction of reason does not involve replacing rca~on with 
something else. Faith docs not supplant reason in any of its forms, as 1f 
faith could render mathematics or medicine or politic.ii thought unnec-
essary. The pursuit of justice as properly the function of practical reason 
is emphatically reaffirmed by the encyclical (DCE, §28). One could go 
so far as to say that the encyclical enjoins on us the rational pursuit of the 
question that animates Plato's Republic: 
The St.1tc must inevitably f.ice the question of how justice can be 
achieved here and now. But tlus presupposes .111 even more r.idical ques-
oon: wh,u 1s jusnce?The problem 1s one of prncocal reason: but 1f rl·ason 
is to be exercised properly, 1t must undergo t·onstam punficaoon, ~mce 
it can never be completely free of the danger of a certam ethical blind-
ness caused by the dazzlmg effect of power and speoal mterests 
Here politics and faith meet. Fdlth by its specific nanire 1s an 
encounter with the living God-an encounter opening up new hori-
zons extending beyond the sphere of reason But it 1s .ilso a punfymg 
·'
4 Virgil Ne111oianu ("The Church and the Secul.ir Escabhshmcnc," 17- 42) makes 
.i similar poinc in regard to Cudinal R.itz.111ger's dpproach to Habermas in their 
dialogue held in Janu.iry 2004 .ind published. 111 English, as Tiie Di1ilt<t1b of Stm-
"1rizc1tic111: 011 Rc11so11 ,,,,J R!'i(11ic111. Ne11101dm1wrnes:"Thus1t .ippedrs tlutjoscph 
Ratzinger was wise to accept .i sociolmtorical level of reference, r.ithcr than to 
w1thdr.iw haughnly into the doma111 of dogm.mc theoloizy as had been often 
done 111 the past. Such a withdrawal mevitably closes a number of doors Jnd 
raises perhaps inmperablc dininilties w J gem11ne dialog" (.34). 
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force for reason itself. From Cod's standpoint, faith liberates reason from 
itS bhnd spotS and therefore helps it co be ever more fully itself. Faith 
enables re:ison to do its work more effecovely and co sec its proper 
obJeCt more dearly. (DCE, §28a) 
This purification of reason urges that reason be reason. It does not add 
missing insights that are in principle inaccessible to reason.There arc c,1scs 
where revelation opens up an understanding of God or of love that docs 
not appear to natural human reason. There, revelarion takes us "beyond 
the sphere of reason." Here, Benedict claims that faith helps reason 
accomplish better the activities that are proper to the realm of human 
reason.35 The inquiry into what justice is and the attempt to achieve 
justice in deed are casks that belong co the secular realm ("the State"), and 
Benedict denies that the Church or religious leaders should usurp this 
function. The Church's role is limited to cncouragmg .111d assisting the 
political agents in their own proper activities. This means, among other 
things, that Benedict and the Church urge the pursuit of political life 
precisely as the achievement of practical reason and polit1cal philosophy, 
not as expressions of faith or the work of the Church. Political move-
ments and forms of political thought ltke Marxism require a reasoned, 
philosophical response, not simply a theological one. The Church is not 
indifferent to the character of the political order, but she recognizes that 
the care of the political order does not belong to her, but requires the 
cultivation of reason.36 
Much of the encyclical appeals to this self-critical form of reason. Just 
as we have seen that a central goal of the second part is to purify the desire 
for justice from its corruption into Marxism, it seems true to say that a 
central goal of the first part is to purify eros &om its corruption into 
bodily eroticism. For example, in his response to the objection made by 
Nietzsche (that Christianity had poisoned eros) (DCE, §3), Benedict 
repeatedly emphasizes that the Christian confirmation of the goodness of 
the body is an attempt to heal and purify eros. He says that the merely 
35 This 1s wlut was meanc when we concluded the second secaon of dus e\s.iy h} 
saying chat Benedict's Regensburg speech 1s primarily ph1lmoplucal. It pnmmlr 
aims co correct reason's grasp of reason's proper activity. 
36 There is need for additional reflection on the relation of che political co111111u-
mty to the message of the Gospel. In particular, such reflection may help to 
explain why the Holy Father refers co Gods wish co make lil of hunumty ".i 
single fmuly" (Dms Canlas Est, § 19). In order to understand why he s.iys 11 
should be ;i single fanuly-as disunct from. for example . .1 smgle pohuc.tl 
community-we require an intelligent grasp of the d1snncuons among fonm of 
humJn association. 
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bodily or "biological" indulgence in ems, its reduction to "pure 'sex,' " 
amounts to a dehumanized and degraded manifestation of erotic love 
(DCE, §§4 and 5 et passim). The C hristian approach is to "restore" eriis to 
its proper and "authentic grandeur" (DCE, §5). It is not the theological 
meaning of eros that is at issue here, but the natural meaning of human 
sexual love. The restoration occurs when human beings rccogmze their 
nature as a union of body and soul and reject misinterpretations of their 
nature as either pure spirit or pure body. Benedict uses a brief anecdote 
concerning the philosopher Descartes and tbe scientist Gassendi to illus-
trate these mistaken views (DCE, §5). We note that the anecdote illustrates 
the modern doctrine of the soul discussed above. In the re-assertion of 
body-soul unity, Christian faith confirms and reinforces what natural 
reason first shows us about ourselves and urges that philosophy continue 
to do its own proper work. While it is possible to condemn bodily eroti-
cism and materialist Marxism from the superior vantage point of divine 
revelation, it is also true that the proper exercise of reason can show the 
way to overcoming the defects of each of these misunderstandings of 
human nature. Benedict displ.1y~ his understanding of the role of faith in 
facilitating just this corrected or purified exercise of reason.37 
Reaso11 as Preser11i11g Disti11ctio11s 
We saw that the first way in which philosophy harmonizes with faith 
involved preparing for the reception of the understanding revealed by God. 
In this third way, philosophy helps preserve the distinctiveness of what is 
revealed. lt helps us recognize that faith really is different from what reason 
shows us. For example, a clear understandmg of pagan accounts of divinity 
37 In addition to the exJmples discussed in this paragraph, it 1s worth noting that 
cert.Jin fonnulaoons in the encyd1cal sugge~t Benedict 1s pomung subtl) to v.m-
ous philosoplucal errors. For ex.unple, he '' ntes, "When we consider the nnmen-
siry of others' needs, we c~n. on the one hand, be driven tow.1rds an ideology that 
would aim at doing wh.u God's governance of the world appuendy cannot: fully 
resolving every problem" (Dem Caritll< E.<r, §36). Contrast John Stuart M1U: "Yet 
no one whose opinion deserves a momcm's consideration c.111 doubt that most of 
the great pomive ev1h of the world are in themselves removable. and will, if 
human affairs conunuc to improve, be in the end reduced within narrow limits. 
Poverty, in Jny sense implying su£fering, may be completely exunguishcd by the 
wisdom of society combined with the good sense and providence of individuals." 
Mill. Uriliwn.11115111 (lndJJnapohs; H.tcken, 1979), 14. In another case, 11 would be 
mtcresting to 11wcst1gatc whether Benedict's tream1ent of the possibility of a 
commandment to love (sec Dru.< Caritns E.<t, §§14 and l<r!H) is or i$ not meant 
to correct Kant's thesis: "Love .is an inclination cannot be commanded" Kam, 
Fo1111dano11.< of tlie .\.lrtdp/1y.•ics of M1m1L<, 2nd ed., trans. Lewis Wh11e Beck (Upper 
Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), 15. 
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permits us to appreciate wh,1t is distinctive in the Christian sense of God. 
However similar Greek philosophical accounts might seem to the Christ-
ian account, the God who freely creates out of nothing is genuinely differ-
ent from any understanding of God arrived at by the philosophers. 
Recognizing these differences helps us to see that Christian faith is nocjust 
one more religion alongside the others (DCE, §§9 and 11).3~ ln the first 
way, then, reason or philosophy prepares for theology by helping us to 
understand natures before we articulate the lncamaoon, by helping us to 
undersr.1nd opinion before we articulate faith, and by help111g us to under-
stand signs before we articulate the sacraments as effective signs of grace. In 
the third way, we use philosophical understanding to prevent the misun-
derstanding of the Incarnation as a kind of hybridization, of faith as just 
another op1111011, or of the sacraments as ordinary reminders or symbols of 
absent thmgs. Philosophy helps preserve the distinction and resist the 
reduction of Christian mysteries to simpler, natural understandings. Unless 
we resist it, our grasp of the natural order inclines us to reinterpret divine 
things in .1 merely natural way. This pull toward the earth and earthly 
meanings continues to exist even for believers.As we become familiar with 
Christianiry we are liable to forget how strange it is and how much it 
requires us to transcend our ordinary grasp of things. The robust exercise 
of philosophical reason can preserve the otherness of faith to reason. 
One important example of this tendency and its correction on display 
in the encyclical has already been touched upon to some extent. The pref-
erence for earthly justice to divine chariry may be traced at least as far back 
as Judas, when he objected to the anointing of the Lord's feet (John 
12:4-5). This objection, that there is nothing more important than the 
elimination of worldly sorrows, has never really and finaUy gone away. The 
urge toward an idealized, material equaliry as justice seems to belong to 
human nan1re. At any rate, it is repeatedly necessary to avoid confusing 
Christian charity, understood as service, especiaUy to the poor, with its 
look- alike, mere humanitarianism or "social assistance" (DCE, §31) or 
humanitarianism. The possibility of this mistake is evidenced by Julian the 
Apostate. He med to initiate a pagan "equivalent" to the Christian service 
of chariry (DCE, §24). One can perhaps produce, in parallel to the 
Church's charity, a secular system of"social assistance" such that the two 
operations yield identical material results. Both activities would be recog-
nizably good, but Christian charitable activity is always something more 
Jll Add1uon.i.ll)•, tlus awueness of the contr~st between che Chmn~n and the pa~n 
senses of d1vmity helps us to trunk about the emperor's reJecuon of the God of 
Islam. To spe.ik of a God that exceeds lo.l!o.< is to speak of a different God. This 
insight helps us recognize that not every form of faith is faich in the same sense . 
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than its material manifestation. The service of chariry is always for the sake 
of something beyond the worldly good it accomplishe~. Its meaning is not 
limited to and its success is not defined by the degree to which it elimi-
nates worldly evils. The inabiliry to understand this sort of d1stincoon leads 
to a corruption of chariry.39 Even some Christians seem to believe that 
charity 1s nothing more than faJth-based "social assistance .. (DCE, §31). 
They allow their natural desire to eliminate human suffering (sec D CE, 
§20) to overwhelm their understanding of the full good of human beings. 
This leads to d1e inabiliry to recognize chat there are evils worse than bodily 
suffering, with the result that they come to mink the proper Christian atti-
tude is to eliminate all forms of suffering by any available means. The prdc-
tical consequences of this confusion appear when people come to mink 
that the Church must advocate condom use 111 response to AIDS or that 
physician-assisted suicide provides genuine relief of suffering. Often we 
take 1t for granted that Christian faith must agree with what makes sense 
to us rationally. Sometimes, however, as was articulated in me previous 
section, the faith pomts to a correction of reason. On omer occasions, the 
faim also requires us to transcend reason and to recognize something 
higher. Thus Christian faim articulates an understanding of the role of 
suffering that goes beyond philosophical reason. Clear recognition of the 
difference between "social assisc.mce" and chanry preserves the distinctive-
ness of the Christian response to suffering. 
The key to exercising reason in this role 1s attending to and preserv-
ing what may appear to be small differences between the faith and our 
natural understanding. In the Regensburg speech, one such small differ-
ence comes to light through what appears to be a misquotation or 
mistaken paraphrase of Plato's Pltaed(l. The apparent impossibiliry of 
removing controversy and disagreement from philosoph1cal arguments 
has always led some to want to dismiss philosophy altogether. Plato's 
dialogue presents characters frustrated with confusion by the arguments 
they are considering. Benedict attributes the following statement to 
Socrates ("Faim," 16): 
It would be easily understandable if someone became so annoyed at all 
these false noaons that for the rest of his life he despised and mocked 
all talk about being, buc in tlus way he would be deprived of the truth 
of existence and would suffer a great loss. 
3'> See Francis Bacon, 171e Ad1't11ue111e111 of Lcar11i11,f!, 4-8 and 34-35. Bacon amculates 
a fond of scienafic hunumtanamsm that preserves the use of the word "charity," 
but not the meamng. Once aga111, because of the connecuon to mastery of nature, 
the humanitarian goal of modern philosophy is of tremendous significance for thr 
Regensburg speech. 
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A more Literal and complete rranslanon of the te>..'1: runs as follows: 
"Then, Phaedo," he said, "his condition would be a pitiable one if, 
when chere was in face some argument that was true and stable and 
capable ofbemg detected, somebody-through his associaang with the 
very son of arguments that somenmes seem co be true and sometimes 
not--should not blame himself or hJS own anlessness but should end 
up in his distress be mg only too pleased co push the blame off lumself 
and onto the arguments, and from that moment on should finish out 
the rest of his life hating and reviling arguments and should be robbed 
of the truth and knowledge of the things that are."40 
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Plato places in the mouth of Socrates an exhortation co avoid the error 
of misology; the exhortation borders on accusing those who hate philo-
sophical discourse of embracing a great eviJ.41 It is a sin chat consists in 
ignorance and the rejection of the means to its remedy. Benedict recasts 
Socrates's statement as an exculpation and almost as an expression of 
forgiveness. As Benedict sees it, there is forgiveness for those who fail in 
this serious task. When the horizon of faith transcends the boundaries of 
reason, the work of reason itself must be re-appraised in this new light. 
In Deus Caritas Est, another instance of this son of contrast between 
natural understanding and Christian faith comes to light when we attend 
co the fact that Benedict singles out eros as the form of love chat is most 
suitable for expressing the teaching that God is love. Erotic or sexual love 
is the first form of human love that Benedict speaks of at length (DCE, §3). 
He highlights it as the form that is especially useful for bringing out the 
meanmg of divine love. It is not the only form he might have chosen. 
The example of Aqumas alone is enough to show that friendship might 
have been used to explicate charity. Benedict himself points to the 
importaJlce of friendship in the following way. Near the end of section 
12, he identifies the contemplation of the pierced side of Christ as the 
way to understand the truth that God is love, which is the starting-point 
of the encyclical and, he says, the point from which to begin defining 
love. But, as we learn in § 19, the character of this love is Jrie11dsliip, which 
~ 1 The translauon 1s from Plato's Plraedo, trans. Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage. and Eric 
Salem (Newburyport, M;iss.: Focus Classical Library, 1998), 68 (at 90c8--d7). In 
this translation, the four uses of"argument" correspond to four uses of forms of 
AOYO~. For the Greek original, see Plato"s Pl1aedo, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1911). Benedict's citation runs as follows: "'Cf. 90 c--d. For this 
text, cf. also R . Guard101. Der Tod deJ Sokmtfs, 5th ediuon, Mamz-Paderborn 
1987, pp. 218-21" 
4 1 "'[F]or it's not possible,' he said, 'for anybody to experience a greater evil than 
haung argumencs.'" Plato's Plraedo, trans. Eva Brann, 67 (at 89d2-3)). 
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is identified by the reference in this passage to John 15: 13: "Greater love 
h.1s no m.in than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends." It is 
not chat Christ was slain that is indicated by the pierced side, but that he 
had laid down his life for fri ends. Friendship is central for Benedict. This 
forces the question upon us: why docs Benedict not devote more atten-
tion to friendship? 
The answer to this question appears from a consideration of what 
Oenedict does say about friendship. H e mentions "love between friends" 
among the initial senses of the meaning of the word, but it "fades" from 
prominence, along with "love of work" and "love of one's profession," in 
comparison to "the very epitome of love," that between man and woman 
(DCE, §2). lt docs not seem co be accidenul that friendship recedes into 
the background. Benedict appeals to three New Testament words for love: 
rrc>s, pliiliti (the love of friendship), and axapc (DCE, §3). In the next few 
pages, Benedict reduces these three to "two fundamental words: eros, as a 
term to indicate 'worldly' love and fl)!tl/JC, referring to love grounded in and 
shaped by faith" (DCE, §7). Indeed, the title of the section in which he 
identifies the three New Testament terms for love mentions only erc>s and 
11,1111pe. Articulating the proper unity of these /1110 dimensions in the one 
reality of love (sec DC fl, §§7, 8, and 10) is the focus of the first part of the 
encyclical.What happened to friendship? It has not been simply excluded, 
but invested with a new meaning. Oenedict points out that che love 
obtaining between Jesus and the disciples is friendship, but it is friendship 
"with added depth of meaning" (DCE, §3). The pierced side of Christ 
(DCE, § 12) shows us that Christ's love for his disciples is expressed in an 
act of self-oblation and the Eucharist draws us into this act (DCE, §13). 
"This sacrament.11 'mysticism' is social in character, for in sacramental 
communion I become one with the Lord, like all the other communi-
cants .... Union with Christ is also union with all those to whom he gives 
himself" (DCfl, §1 4). The result is that the commandment to love others 
b "now universalized" and embraces all mankind as neighbors (DCE, 
§15). "The parable of the Good Samaritan remains as a standard which 
imposes universal love towards the needy whom we cncounter 'by chance' 
(cf. Lk 10:31), whoever they may be" (DCE, §25b). In this light,Jesus' love 
for his disciples comes to be, not the singling out of his preferred compan-
ions, but a few instances of Jesus' universal love for all mankind. Needless 
to say, such universal love is not something Aristotle, at least, understood 
among the many forms of friendship. In .Benedict's presentation of the 
commandment to love all human beings, there is little or no room for the 
selectivity of the ordinary form of human friendship. Benedict seems to 
assert as much in the paragraph concluding the first part of the encyclical. 
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Love of neighbour is thus shown to be possible in the way proclaimed 
by the Bible, by Jesus. It consists in the very fact that, in God and with 
God, ! love even the person whom l do not like or even know.This can 
only take place on the basis of an intimate encounter with God, an 
encounter which has become a communion of will, affecting my feel-
ings. Then! learn to look on this other person not simply with my eyes 
and my feelings, but from the perspective of Jesus Christ. His friend is 
my friend. (DCE, §18) 
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This does not seem to be a rejection of the natural phenomenon of friend-
ship, but the addition of a new sense of friendship that far transcends the 
ordinary meaning. Benedict does not begin with ordinary friendship and 
extend to this new meaning. He begins with erotic love and articulates 
only this highest and universal friendship. It would be interesting to see this 
account of friendship developed more fully and related to the ordinary 
understanding of friendship, which Benedict mentioned at the beginning. 
We are left wondering what place remains for ordinary friendship within 
the context of the universal command of love. For the present, it is suffi-
cient to note that the manner in which Benedict uses the word "friend-
ship" in this encyclical often has this theological or universal meaning, but 
only our awareness of the natural or philosophical understanding helps us 
recognize the distinctiveness of Benedict's sense of friendship, which seems 
to be what he means when he refers to the "added depth of meaning" 
belonging to this term in John's Gospel (DCE, §3). 
Conclusion 
The three modes of reason operating in harmony with faith should not 
be conceived as rigorously separate from one another. We separate them 
mostly in order to be able to clarify the complexity of the harmonious 
co-operation between faith and reason, but it is hard to imagine that any 
one of them could operate in full independence of the others. The impor-
tant claim is that our reason is necessarily active when we encounter the 
faith for the first time or when we try to deepen our grasp of it and that 
faith calls for "the right use of reason" ("Faith," ~l). In the best case, 
reason or philosophy makes familiar to us the natural realities in relation 
to which the propagation of the faith takes place. In another case, faith 
urges the correction of reason in order to eliminate philosophical errors 
that stand as competitors against faith. In a third case, the philosophical 
use of reason helps to prevent the distinctiveness of faith from sinking 
back into a merely natural account of things. 
In light of the Regensburg speech, a corrected understanding of reason 
itself seems to be what Benedict thinks we need most urgently. Whereas 
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dependence on the natural exercise of reason and on ordinary opinion had 
been recognized by philosophical reason at least since Socrates, modern 
science begins with a rejection of ordinary opinion and of the non-scien-
tific exercise of reason. It is difficult to oversute the 11nportance of this 
posture toward ordinary, non-scientific human intelligence. The domi-
nance of science as the authoritative and sole proper use of reason tends to 
exclude other forms of reason as illegitimate and extra-scientific quesoons 
as unanswerable or meaningless. In this way, science tends to exclude the 
possibilicy of philosophy and theology and faith itself. From another direc-
tion, some conceptions of God as beyond human reason tend to exclude 
the possibilicy of any solid reliance on our reason. Benedict's speech aims 
to recover the significance of the ordinary form of reason as the unifying 
clement that underlies all developed forms of reason: theology and philos-
ophy as well as science. Benedict·s speech presents an argument that some 
forms of faith or theology on the one hand and some forms of modern 
scientific r.itionalism on the other can be recognized as deficient by refer-
ence to the ordinary form of reason and its philosophical exercise. This is 
possible only if we take ordinary human rational icy seriously. Consequently, 
the goal of the speech is to reinvigorate this sense of rationalicy in order to 
pave the way for the harmonious interaction of reason with faith. Pope 
Benedict, then, attempts to defend a broadened understanding of reason 
against both Islam and modern scientific rationalism, with a view to 
making intelligible the harmony of faith and reason. N v 
